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Is Taiwan a Presidential System?
Ondrej Kucera
1 The Taiwanese government underwent substantial change in the 1990s. A majority of
political scientists and some politicians classify or claim its system to now be semi-
presidential2.  However there are some competing interpretations that claim it to be
either  “of  a  parliamentarian  kind”3,  “being  presidential”4 or  “moving  towards  a
presidential  type”5.  Some political  scientists claim that the classification of political
systems is not trichotomic (parliamentarian, semi-presidential, presidential) but only
dichotomic, and in such a case Taiwan also has to be classified or interpreted as either a
presidential or parliamentarian system6. Maurice Duverger, the father of the concept of
a  semi-presidential  government,  asserts  that  a  semi-presidential  system  is  not  a
synthesis of a presidential  system and a parliamentary system, but rather a system
which—depending on whether the President has majority support in the legislature—
reverts either to a parliamentary or to a presidential form of government7. 
2 We will try to answer three questions in this article: Is it always possible to “classify”8 a
given government as one particular type or another, or is it sufficient to “interpret9 the
nature” of that government? How could the government of Taiwan be classified? What,
if any, are the consequences of such classification?
Presidential and parliamentary systems
3 Robert Elgie was the first to argue that there are three methods for classification of
semi-presidential  systems in the literature:  “The first  type of  definition is  one that
considers  only  the  actual  powers  of  political  actors,  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  the
relational properties of democratic regime types... The second type of definition is one
that  combines  formal  constitutional  arrangements  with  actual  powers,  or,  more
accurately, dispositional and relational properties... ...a third type of definition derived
from the dispositional properties of regime types alone” 10 [this definition is thus based
only on the analysis of formal constitutional arrangements]. 
4 The combination of dispositional and relational properties is used in the definition of
Maurice Duverger: “The concept of semi-presidential form of government....is defined
...by the content of Constitution. A political regime is considered as semi-presidential if
the Constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the President of the
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Republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3)
he has opposite him, however, a Prime Minister and ministers who possess executive
and governmental power and can stay in office only if the Parliament does not show
opposition to them...”11.
5 This  definition  was  considerably  modified  by  Giovanni  Sartori12.  Sartori  puts  the
emphasis of this definition on the power relationship between President and Prime
Minister (four of the five criteria), but it still focuses on the Constitution. Patrick O’Neil
defines a  semi-presidential  regime  as  one  where  the  executive  power  is  divided
between  the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister,  but  where  the  President  has  quite
substantial  powers13.  From  this  type  of  definition  we  have  to  class  the  respective
governments by looking at  the respective powers of  the head of  state  and head of
government. The direct election of the President is irrelevant for this definition14. This
definition  is  concerned  only  with  the  real  power  characteristics  of  the  respective
system (also referred to as relational properties).
6 Robert Elgie in his general work on the classification of regime types15 and also in a
work focusing specifically on semi-presidential regimes16 affirms that “classifications of
regime types should be derived either from the dispositional properties of regimes or
from their relational properties but not from both together” 17. He also claims that “it is
better to classify regime types on the basis of their dispositional properties rather than
their  relational  properties  because  they  can  be  objectively  derived  from  the
Constitution,  and therefore create  conditions for  a  more scientific  analysis...”18.  His
proposed definition of semi-presidential regime based only on dispositional properties
of the regime has only three criteria: a popularly elected President; a fixed term for the
President; the President exists alongside the Prime Minister and a cabinet responsible
to Parliament 19. 
Constitutional regimes and political systems 
7 The Constitution can only have “potential” relational properties,  which are actually
implemented (in  various  different  ways  and to different  degrees)  into  the  political
system.  In  his  discussion  of  relational  properties,  Elgie,  as  other  authors,  mix  the
potential  relational  properties  and  their  actual  realisation.  They  mix  the  power
positions of players prescribed by the Constitution and the actual power positions in
the system. 
8 The French constitutional scientist Olivier Duhamel emphasises the need to distinguish
the definition criteria  based on constitutional  structure and the ones  based on the
behaviour of government (and its key players). He considers the first set of criteria to
define the constitutional regime of the particular country and the second set of criteria
to define the particular country’s political system20.  We agree with the above-stated
methodological position, a variation of which has recently been articulated by Thomas
Sedelius: “It seems more appropriate to argue ...that semi-presidential systems exhibit
various forms of political practices within the same constitutional framework”21. 
9 It is strictly necessary to distinguish between the analysis of a constitutional regime
and  a  political system.  Two  theories  can  be  used  for  describing  characteristics  of
political  systems:  Arend Lijphart’s  theory  of  consensual  government  and  Guillermo
O’Donnel’s theory of delegative democracy. Lijphart defines political systems on the
continuum  from  majoritarian  to  consensual22.  The  majoritarian  political  system
corresponds  more  with  the  presidential  regime,  or  as  Thomas  Poguntke  puts  it
—“majoritarian democracies have a higher potential for presidential tendencies...”23. 
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10 The  theory  of  Guillermo  O’Donnell,  which  was  derived  from  the  analysis  of  real
functioning  of  South  American  presidential  democracies24,  deals  with  the  real
behaviour of a President in a presidential system of government, and it defines one side
of another typological continuum, which is the delegative democracy in opposition to
“classical” representative democracy.
11 We divide the definition of the Taiwanese system of government into the definition of
its constitutional regime and into the characterisation of its political system. Only the
constitutional  regime can be defined and therefore the trichotomic classification of
regimes is applicable only to the first part of the definition. The political system can be
merely  described  or  characterised,  and  therefore  only  the  tendencies  towards
presidentialisation  of  a  respective  non-presidential  constitutional  regime
(parliamentary, semi-presidential) can be observed.
Taiwanese constitutional regime
12 The President is directly (popularly) elected according to the Article 2, paragraph 1 of
Additional articles to the Constitution of the Republic of China (AA). He is, according to
Article 2, paragraph 6 of AA, elected for a fixed term of four years. Article 3, paragraph
1 of AA creates the Prime Minister (president of Executive Yuan) and cabinet (Executive
Yuan).  Both are responsible to Parliament (Legislative Yuan) according to Article 3,
paragraph  2.  The  Legislative  Yuan  has  the  specific  right  to  vote  on  a  call  of  no
confidence, which would remove the Prime Minister and cabinet. All the dispositional
properties of  the definition of  semi-presidential  constitutional  regime are therefore
met.
13 The  President  has  only  one  power  that  he  can  exercise on  his  own:  the  power  to
appoint and remove Prime Ministers. The rest of the important President’s decisions
are either countersigned by the Prime Minister or the Legislative Yuan. It therefore
necessitates the player’s co-operation25. The President has, according to the Article 2,
paragraph 3 of AA, the power “to issue emergency decrees and take all the necessary
measures to avert imminent danger affecting the security of the state or of the people
or to cope with any serious financial or economic crisis” 26. He therefore has potential
extraordinary powers. “In case of disputes between two or more Yuan other than those
concerning which there are relevant provisions in this Constitution, the President may
call a meeting of the presidents of the Yuan concerned for consultation with a view to
reaching  a  solution”27.  Again  the  Constitution  prescribes  him the  power  to  initiate
arbitration between the key players. The possibility of recall of the elected official28 and
the exercise of the right of referendum29 are features of direct democracy prescribed by
the Constitution that exist in the political reality of today’s Taiwan. The Constitution,
however, also stipulates in Article 136 that the people have the right of initiative, but
this  has  in no way affected the political  reality,  nor is  there even a  mechanism to
exercise this right. It appears that the relational properties present in the Republic of
China Constitution also prescribe for Taiwan a semi-presidential constitutional regime. 
Majoritarian government on Taiwan
14 The KMT government was,  until  the 2000 presidential elections, clearly a one-party
cabinet as a result of the KMT legislative majority, and also concurrently holding the
presidency.  Shelley  Rigger  predicted in  2000 that  the Democratic  Progressive  Party
(DPP)’s Chen Shui-bian’s victory would force him to form a coalition government that
would  have  to  include  members  of  KMT  as  well  as  independents30.  The  prediction
proved to  be  true  concerning the  new Executive  Yuan’s  composition,  however  this
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cross-party membership wasn’t the result of coalition agreement, but members of the
opposition parties (mainly KMT) entered the government on an individual basis. The
situation was considered by President Chen to be temporary and he personally vowed
to create a genuine coalition with the opposition parties after the 2001 Parliamentary
elections31. However the Cabinet created after the parliamentary elections in 2001 was
again composed mainly of politicians loyal to President. The new Prime Minister Yu
Shyi-kun has been a long-time co-worker with the President, having been a secretary to
the Presidential office, so the Cabinet has become more of a President’s secretariat and
the number of DPP party members increased. 
15 After the parliamentary elections of 2004, with the appointment of the Chen’s long-
standing DPP rival Frank Hsieh to the position of Prime Minister, the number of DPP
members has increased again32 and the Cabinet has become a more independent body.
The attempts to include some opposition KMT politicians in the Cabinet on an official
basis (specifically the offer of the vice-premier position to the KMT) have been blocked
by the conditions the KMT put forward. These conditions could have signalled a push
towards a two-party coalition Cabinet, but were rejected by the DPP. Never during his
time in office has President Chen made a concrete offer or has entered into formal
consultations  to  create  a  coalition-government33.  There  were  rumours  in  December
2005 in Taiwan that Chen was talking again about creating a coalition government,34
but none of them proved to be true. 
16 Until  2000  the  system  was  clearly  dominated  by  executive  power.  It  was  a  logical
outgrowth of the situation where the presidency and the ruling party chairmanship
were dominated by one person (as in the case of the Chiangs and Lee Teng-hui). The
situation was changed by the 2000 presidential elections and Parliament has acquired a
more important role. The executive branch has retained the agenda-setting power, but
Parliament has begun to learn how to be a veto player (especially after Ma Ying-jeou’s
accession to the KMT party chairmanship).
17 Chen Shui-bian acquired the chairmanship of the DPP in his move to retain domination
of executive power (emulating the previous KMT situation), and the party has become a
platform for communication of  the President’s  executive policies  (he stepped down
after losing the 2004 parliamentary elections). However the inability of the President to
overpower the legislature and to implement his issues through legislation has resulted
in legislative “gridlock”. “The Law Governing Legislator’s Exercise of Power” enacted
on January 25th 1999 and revised on January 25th 200235 could alleviate the gridlock.
This law has provided for the possibility of partisan negotiations in the legislature,
when  consensus  over  a  Bill  cannot  be  reached.  However,  this  method  is  criticised
because it lacks transparency of decision36. On the other hand the Legislative Yuan is
asserting its will by its ability to cut the government’s budget, thus strengthening its
own position37. 
18 Wu Shan-yu argues that after his initial uncertainty, Chen Shui-bian has slowly learned
how to assert himself over the Legislative Yuan and he is gradually moving towards
being the dominant one in the relationship38. He was seen to be a reactive President in
the first year of his presidency39, but later demonstrated his ability to influence policy-
making  even  without  a  legislative  majority.  He  skilfully  uses  direct  appeals  to  the
public, thus setting a precedent for future Presidents to emulate40. The best example of
a policy victory can be seen in Chen’s proposal for referendum legislation. Due to public
pressure, Parliament has supported a watered down version of a referendum, allowing
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Chen  to  score  a  policy  victory41.  Chen  is  trying  hard  to  maximise  his  powers  by
emulating his KMT predecessors. The condition of the domination of executive power is
therefore  met,  even  with  an  apparent  tendency  towards  losing  this  dominance,
especially  in  2005  (when  opposition  leaders  made  trips  to  the  mainland),  while
opposition uses its tools and learns how to be effective. 
19 The effective number of political parties on Taiwan42 (1995 – 2.54; 1998 – 2.46) has shot
up at the 2001 parliamentary elections (3.45) and declined a bit in the elections of 2004
(3.26). The emergence of pan-blue and pan-green camps in the 2001 election has kept
the Taiwanese party system close to real bipartism. The recent constitutional change43
will probably lead the party system towards bipartism by its own inertia, as is already
happening by the transfer of MPs from the PFP to the KMT.
20 There is very strong network of independent local factions on Taiwan, held together by
ties  of  blood,  kinship,  marriage  and personal  relationships44.  This  system therefore
strongly deters the creation of the centralist, government-created system of interest
groups.  It  was  estimated  in  2000  that  about  60%  of  legislators  represented  local
factions45. The thesis that Taiwan enjoys a plurality of interest groups is also supported
by  Ya-Chung  Chuang,  who  claims  that  on  Taiwan,  there  has  gradually  emerged  a
network of grassroots social movements46, and by Ming-sho Ho who claims that “the
DPP government opened new policy channels. Social movement activists were given
the chance to work within existing government institutions, [and] once they secured
government positions, these activists were able to produce some procedural changes as
favored by social movements”47. 
21 The Taiwanese political system can be characterised by strong majoritarian tendencies,
which reflect Taiwan’s authoritarian past, and these were sustained after the beginning
of  democratisation due to  the  prevailing presidential  government  during Lee’s  era,
even while already having established a semi-presidential constitutional regime. The
type of democratisation on Taiwan―the ruling elite engineered type, which retained
the elite in power long after successful regime transition―has therefore retained part
of the previous authoritarian regime’s political culture―the majoritarian behaviour.
These tendencies were only mildly moderated after the 2000 presidential elections by
Taiwan’s constitutional regime and voting system.
Delegative democracy on Taiwan 
22 Delegative democracy influences the functioning of the government, and especially the
move  towards  personalised  (presidentialised)  government,  while  having  a  semi-
presidential constitutional regime can be viewed as less behaving the way prescribed
by the Constitution and so less representing the election results. 
23 Before the 2000 government split,  it  was not really necessary for the Presidents to
assert  themselves  as  “supra  party”  because  they  commanded  a  clear  majority.
President Chen, lacking this majority, claimed in his first inaugural speech, in 2000,
that he would attempt “to establish a supra-party government”.... On coming to office
he called for the creation of “a government for all the people”. He also called for the
creation of a “cross-party alliance for national stability” during the legislative election
of 200148. His tactics of directly appealing to the public49 can also be viewed as trying to
circumvent the prescribed constitutional method of governing.
24 Only under Chen Shui-bian did the government begin to describe the legislature as a
major stumbling block hindering reform initiatives through tardiness in dealing with
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government bills50. Hermann Halbeisen also argues that Chen’s supra-party approach...
“has to be seen as a conscious attempt to split the political opposition, thereby eliciting
hostile reactions of both the KMT and the PFP”. 
25 The  President  has  been  traditionally  the  keystone  of  politics  for  the  reasons  of
concurrent chairmanship of  the previously predominant party―the KMT. After  the
constitutional revision of the appointment of the Prime Minister (it no longer requires
the consent of the Legislative Yuan),  in popular understanding the President of the
Republic became Taiwan’s chief executive. Premier Lien Chan once described himself as
“the  secretary  of  the  President”51.  Yu  Shyi-kun―former  chief  of  staff  of  the
presidential office behaved as the “chief of staff” even as Prime Minister.
26 Revising the DPP party charter and making the incumbent President automatically the
chairman of the DPP has also strengthened the position of the President in the political
process.  However  this  characteristic  has  changed  since  the  2004  parliamentary
elections. President Chen stepped down from his position of party chairman, and the
DPP party situation now appears to be reverting more to the consensual politics of
three key players (President, Prime Minister, party chairman) and is becoming more
representative. 
27 The tradition of isolating himself from existing political institutions and the tradition
of circumventing them had already begun with Lee Teng-hui at the beginning of his
presidency due to Lee’s lack of support in existing political institutions, even in his own
party. The first successful circumventing action was Lee’s call  for a National Affairs
Conference  of  leaders  across  the  political  spectrum,  which  was  used  to  break  the
“gridlock” within the KMT over political reform52. Another instance of such behaviour
was the convention of the National Development Council, which was held in December
1996 with participants from the government and the public sector. The Council reached
consensus  on  constitutional  reform  which  is  currently  being  implemented  (as  of
2005)53.  By  both  these  extra-governmental  bodies  Lee  created  extra-constitutional
institutions used for promoting his personal policies. In his second term of office in
particular  Lee’s  strong  leadership  became  more  arbitrary  and  resulted  in  massive
corruption and a confrontational style which helped to fracture the KMT54, including
pushing  aside  his  designated  successor,  former  Taiwan governor  James  Soong,  and
personally promoting his own premier, Lien Chan. The KMT would not have nominated
him had it  not  been for  Lee’s  personal  push55.  He  thus  created by  his  behaviour  a
negative institutional legacy undercutting the new presidency under Chen56.
28 In the beginning of  his  first  term Chen surrounded himself  with about thirty aides
known  as  “Boy  scouts”,  and  with  them  tried  rather  unsuccessfully  to  set  his  own
agenda.  In the first  year of  his  presidency he isolated himself  even within his  own
party57.  The convening of  the National  Economic Development Advisory Conference
(first proposed in a televised speech on May 18th 2001) provided a vehicle for Chen to
push his own policies and, as Halbeisen claims, “it was the first time Chen had shown
that he had both understood his position of weakness and also how, with that position,
to still get what he wanted”58. 
29 Taiwan  exhibits  a  clear  drift  toward  the  situation  where  the  real  decision-making
power in the system is “delegated” to the President. It is also conforming to Poguntke’s
definition of presidentialisation of governments.
Aftermath of the 2004 parliamentary elections
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30 Chen Shui-bian apologised to DPP supporters right after the elections (in which, shortly
after  narrowly  winning  re-election under  dubious  conditions,  he  did  not  achieve  a
parliamentary majority), saying that he would take the voter’s verdict as an invitation
for serious self-examination…He said that he would make it a priority to find ways to
co-operate with the opposition and implement policies for the good of nation59 (see
box). This consensual rhetoric was proved by subsequent events to be hollow words
and the developments of spring 2006 has offered no hope for the Taiwanese political
system to become consensual.
President Chen's New Year's Day Address
31 The choice of the people [in the 2004 elections] sent a clear message: The governing
party must rule with humility while the opposition parties are rational in providing
oversight.  Taiwan's  society  does  not  need  bifurcation  between  the  blue  and  green
camps, nor does it need ongoing confrontation between the governing and opposition
parties. The governing and opposition parties each have their own roles to play. Fair
competition,  co-operation  rather  than  confrontation,  checks  and  balances,  and
solidarity rather than infighting―these are now the ardent expectations of the people
of Taiwan. I myself identify very strongly with the voice of the people, and fully grasp
where my duties and responsibilities as President lie...I would like to hereby advocate
openly that Taiwan must head towards a new era of consultation and dialogue. 
32 During the election, there might have been a Pan-Green and Pan-Blue divide; but, with
the election now behind us, there should only be "one country and a unified people"
here in Taiwan...60
Taiwan President Names New Premier 
33 Taiwan's President on Tuesday named a skilful negotiator from his party as the new
premier,  while  pledging reconciliation between his  government  and the  opposition
alliance, as well as rival China. "We will search all possibilities for reconciliation, Chen
said. We must give up partisan interests and ideological divides.61
Premier Hopes for Political Reconciliation in 2005 
34 Hsieh  called  his  cabinet  a  "reconciliation  cabinet,"  in  contrast  to  his  predecessor's
"combat cabinet". 62
The New Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party
35 High-ranking officials from the pan-blue and pan-green camp were stepping over each
other  in  their  effort  to  demonstrate  their  newfound  respect  for  "political
reconciliation" at a ceremony held yesterday morning at the Democratic Progressive
Party's (DPP) headquarters, in which Su Tseng-chang became the new chairman of the
DPP.63 
10-point agreement signed
36 Marking a milestone in inter-party co-operation, President Chen Shui-bian and People
First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong held a historic meeting yesterday where they
reached a consensus to acknowledge and respect the current definition of Taiwan's
status, create a legal basis for cross-Strait peace, and reiterated their support for the
Republic of China. 
37 After the meeting at the Taipei Guest House yesterday morning, Chen and Soong signed
a  joint  10-point  agreement  on  cross-Strait  relations,  national  defence  and  ethnic
reconciliation. The consensus was hailed as the beginning of dialogue and discussion
between the governing and opposition camps...
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38 Chen's accord with Soong includes substantive and major commitments. For one, Chen
openly pledged that he would not push for changing the title of the country during the
remainder of his term, and that any constitutional reform would require consensus
between the governing and opposition parties.64
The parliamentary gridlock, “constitutional” transfer of powers and the recall motion
39 The situation in the spring of 2006 became quite the reverse of the DPP’s proclaimed
attempts for consolidating government. After losing in the 2005 local elections the DPP
was pushed back onto the defensive and as a result the prime ministerial post changed
yet again. Frank Hsieh was replaced by Su Tseng-chang. The DPP tried to gain ground
by abolishing the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines in
February 2006,  angering the pan blue camp, being a move that  could be viewed as
aimed towards an independent Taiwan. The situation in Parliament became tense, and
after a series of corruption scandals that pointed to the top-most echelons of the DPP,
also implicating the President’s son-in-law and the President’s wife, the PFP and the
KMT began to consider the recall of the president. Amidst the recall discussions Chen
publicly handed some constitutional powers to the Premier. 
40 The state of gridlock in the Legislature can best be described by citing from the article
published in Taipei Times on June 1st 2006, page 8: “Unsurprisingly [emphasis added],
the Legislative  Yuan ended its  spring session in  chaos,  failing to  pass  a  number of
critical bills that seriously affect the livelihoods of ordinary people and the national
interest. Amendments to the Statute Governing the Relations Between the People of the
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area failed for a third time after physical confrontation
between the governing and opposition parties.  The pan-greens stopped the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP) from putting the amendment
to a vote on the legislative floor. The pan-blues, in return, blocked all of the Democratic
Progressive Party's (DPP) proposals, and the legislature went into its summer recess on
Tuesday amid pandemonium”. 
41 The  number  of  bills  passed  through  the  Legislative  Yuan  is  constantly  dropping.
Seventy-five were passed in the last session, down from eighty-six passed during the
previous  session.  Almost  no  important  bills  were  passed during this  spring session
2006, leaving many very important bills on hold65.
42 President  Chen resolved on 31st  of  May 2006 that  from now on all  Cabinet-related
matters would be in the hands of the premier. The President also said that he would
respect Su's nominations for Cabinet personnel. Chen said that although as a member
of the DPP he had an obligation to make a contribution to the party, he would no longer
participate in DPP internal affairs, nor campaign on behalf of party members running
for public office. 
43 He has been publicly declaring what has become apparent. His loss of real power. It is
however difficult to say if it is legitimate to transfer his powers into the hands of Prime
Minister only or if this is just another exercise in rhetoric as the head of the KMT said:
“It's  absurd to cede presidential  powers.  It  is  a  dereliction of  duty if  the President
delegates  the  powers  granted  to  him by  the  Constitution...  As  for  powers  that  the
President was not  given constitutionally,  there is  nothing for  him to give up or to
delegate. If there are any, then they were invented by the President himself”66.
44 The  former  DPP  Premier  Frank  Hsieh  has  probably  unintentionally  confirmed  the
notion  of  Chen  overstepping  his  constitutional  powers  when  he  said  that  “letting
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things return to the constitutional system is a good thing. I hope Taiwanese society can
gradually get back on a normal track...”67. 
45 The final touch to the stubborn, majoritarian stance of opposing camps came into play
during the last days of May 2006 when a proposal to recall President Chen Shui-bian
was  submitted  to  the  legislature  by  pan-blue  lawmakers  on  May  30th  200668.  The
motion was signed by 72 legislators, more than the required one-quarter of the 221-
seat legislature. However President Chen Shui-bian survived the first-ever presidential
recall vote on June 27th, when the 119 votes for the measure fell far short of the two-
thirds majority needed to approve it. The recall motion had again created or, it is better
to say, sustained, confrontation between the two major party alliances.
46 The events  of  spring 2006  clearly  show the  delegative  feature  of  Taiwan’s  political
system. The President feels he can make decisions about constitutional powers himself.
His handing-down of presidential powers to the Prime Minister can be seen as a strong
example  of  a  President  ignoring  the  Constitution.  Either  he  exercised  extra-
constitutional powers before his move and, as is being claimed by DPP, he has now
restored constitutional behaviour; or he moved his constitutional powers to the Prime
Minister and is therefore behaving unconstitutionally now. Because if  the President
feels  that  he  has  lost  the  ability  to  exercise  the  powers  prescribed  to  him  by  the
Constitution he has the only constitutional solution―resign from office and let  the
vice-president do his job. That is, as a matter of fact, the reason for the existence of the
vice-president’s  office—that  he/she  can  step  into  the  place  of  an  inept  President
without having to go through new elections.
47 The  majoritarian  features  in  Taiwanese  politics  are  being  enhanced.  Legislative
gridlock is deepened by the inability to pass any relevant bills. The transfer of powers
to the Prime Minister was aimed at strengthening executive power amid the bribery
scandal  touching  the  President  and  the  recall  motion  has  also  strengthened  the
bipartisan features of Taiwan’s political system, because the pan-blue and pan-green
camps  were  set  against  each  other  during  the  campaign  surrounding  the  motion
process.
48 Taiwanese politics are working under a semi-presidential constitutional regime. It is
possible  to  conclude  that  the  Taiwanese  political  system  was  during  Chen’s  first
presidency moving towards the presidential system as he claimed69. However it was not
because of the changing constitutional arrangement or changing institutional design of
the system, but more due to the real behaviour of the key players in the political arena
—President Chen himself working hard to fulfil his own predictions. After the heated
election year of  2004,  the players in the arena that year appeared tired of  fighting
without  ever  reaching  the  desired  majoritarian  (Caesarian)  outcome.  Therefore,
seemingly forced by circumstances, President Chen began, with his New Year’s address
in 2005, an attempt to consolidate the government’s functioning by moving towards a
more consensual  and representative style  of  governing.  He stepped down from the
position  of  DPP  party  chairman,  and  thus  gave  more  space  to  a  consensual  and
representative style of governing in his own ruling (but not majority) party. Naming
Frank Hsieh, one of his own rivals in the party, Prime Minister, was a prime example,
the election of Su Tseng-chang as DPP party chairman was another. 
49 On the other hand Taiwanese politics exhibits deeply anchored traits of majoritarian
behaviour. Hsieh didn’t succeed in including a rival party (KMT) vice-premier into his
Cabinet, and the rapprochement between the DPP and KMT did not proceed. Ma Ying-
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jeou  after  his  accession  to  the  post  of  KMT  chairman  has  begun  to  use  tactics  of
“scorched  earth”  in  the  Legislative  Yuan,  thus  blocking  most  DPP  proposals.  This
majoritarian  tactic,  an  embedded  trait  of  Taiwanese  politics  which  draws  on  deep
historical  and  structural  roots,  can  be  seen  as  a  means  of  achieving  the  desired
consensual outcome―coalition government (on the side of the KMT). The historical
roots―the authoritarian past—are already mentioned above; the structural roots of the
situation consist of two main features—the SNTV voting system and from the transition
to democracy rift in society. The role of the SNTV voting system can be viewed as very
negative, because it puts even candidates from the same party into competition with
each other70. Politics is thus getting too personalised at all levels and as such influences
the players’ behaviour. For example neither Lien nor Soong was present at Chen Shui-
bian’s inauguration ceremony71. Taiwan’s transition to democracy has also revealed the
persistent cleavage between earlier and post-1945 immigrants and this cleavage is used
in elections to sharpen the differences and polarise society. Even as the SNTV voting
system is becoming obsolete, it  leaves behind the legacy of deeply divided factional
local politics which will take a long time to improve.
50 Taiwan is exhibiting only few minor signs of moving towards a more consensual or
more representative government,  even though such a  movement would be its  only
possibility  under  the  present  constitutional  regime  for  achieving  democratic
government  functionality.  The  political  system  is  unused  to  compromise  and
consensus, and views any yielding of ideals towards the pursuit of a common goal as a
betrayal or weakness. The consensual approach as seen in the aftermath of the 2004
parliamentary elections will probably remain only a rhetorical figure of the past and
another weapon in the majoritarian political game.
51 An  easier  solution  from  the  arsenal  of  constitutional  engineering―considering  the
deeply  embedded  majoritarian  characteristics  of  Taiwanese  politics—would  be  to
change  the  design  of  the  ROC Constitution.  The  recent  change  in  voting  system is
claimed to solve the situation by simplifying the elections while the predicted outcome
will  tend  to  create  bipartism  and  ease  the  creation  of  a  one-party  Executive
government. This result is however based on one presumed outcome—the alignment of
presidential and parliamentary elections. However some political commentators and
even Chen himself72 claim that the result of the 2004 parliamentary elections showed
the will of the electorate for reconciliation and compromise. It is therefore not unlikely
that the voters in their desire for preserving the contemporary status quo on the most
important Taiwan issue of division—independence versus unification with the PRC73—
would  split  their  votes,  thus  creating  the  same  situation  which  blocks  Taiwan’s
legislative process today.
52 The solution to this problem which would keep the majoritarian political system and
which would eliminate the delegative features of it as a parliamentary constitutional
regime coupled with a simple majority voting system in one member districts74. The
simple majority voting system would in all  probability produce a majority party in
government and this party would be able to nominate the Prime Minister as the head of
the Executive branch of government, responsible to Parliament. Only such a solution
could solve the problem of legislative “gridlock” in the long term. It is also possible that
the parties in the bipartisan system would have to reach for the centrist voter to win,
thus  easing  the  tension  of  the  current  divide.  It  is  much  easier  to  adjust  the
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Constitution to  fit  the  prevailing  political  culture  then to  try  to  change Taiwanese
politics.
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RÉSUMÉS
This  article  considers  definitions  of  semi-presidential  systems,  distinguishing  prescriptive
criteria (constitutional regime) and descriptive criteria (political system). Applying prescriptive
criteria to the Taiwanese situation, it  concludes that the Taiwanese Constitution prescribes a
semi-presidential regime. The article then analyses the descriptive features of Taiwan’s political
system. The conclusions are enhanced by a close analysis of the situation in the aftermath of
Taiwan’s  2004  parliamentary  elections  and  also  from  the  events  in  the  spring  of  2006  (the
delegation of constitutional powers and recall motion). Taiwan’s political system exhibits both
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very strong majoritarian and delegative tendencies, the main reasons for the lack of functionality
under the present constitutional regime. That the political system is resistant to change means,
for this article, that the only possibility for democratic government functionality for Taiwan is a
change of constitutional regime to one that is parliamentary1. 
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